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Introduction 
Plaintiffs Skyler Witman, John Washenko, Jonathan Bonnette, Matt 
Lovelady, and Don Jorgensen (collectively, "Plaintiffs") claim that their former 
accountant, Richard Bloomfield, and Richard Bloomfield CFO, PLLC 
(collectively, "Defendants"), advised them to invest in oil and gas tax shelters in 
2008 to receive tax benefits, and that they were damaged because they received 
no tax benefits that year. The central question on appeal is whether the jury had 
an evidentiary basis to award Plaintiffs the full amount of their 2008 invesbnents, 
even though Plaintiffs received tax benefits from those same investments in other 
years. Consistent with this evidence, Plaintiffs' only expert on damages admitted 
that his opinion was "speculative" because he failed to consider whether 
Plaintiffs had used the tax losses generated by their 2008 investments in other 
years, as authorized by the IRS. [R.9628.] On this evidentiary record, the district 
court not only abused its discretion in allowing Plaintiffs' expert to testify, it 
erred in failing to vacate the jury's award of the full amount of the 2008 
VJ) investment because it is unsupported by the evidence. 
Under Utah law, plaintiffs must provide evidence of net damages. [Op.Br. 
at 39.] Plaintiffs do not squarely confront this flaw in their case. Instead, they 
assert that the cases cited by Defendants arose in "different factual contexts," and 
that their expert's testimony was sufficient because he concluded the benefits 
were "uncertain." [Resp.Br. at 33, 46.] But there is no exception to Utah's net 
1 
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damages requirement for tax cases. Nor should there be. To calculate Plaintiffs' 
net damages, an expert needed to consider only the tax returns Plaintiffs filed, 
and in the event that tax losses remain, provide a reasonable opinion as to the 
current value of the benefits that would accrue in future years. Plaintiffs' expert 
admitted at trial that he could have performed this calculation, but did not. And 
his failure to consider these benefits, as well as the fungibility of Plaintiffs' 
various tax losses, rendered his damages opinion not only "speculative" but also 
insufficient as a matter of law. [R.9628.] 
Plaintiffs' failure to fulfill their discovery obligations and the rule 702 
requirements orbit around the central question described above. Those failures 
include (1) failing to properly disclose their experts' opinion (or offer any hint 
that he would be opining on damages), (2) failing to limit Plaintiffs' expert report 
to the topics (inadequately) disclosed, (3) failing to reveal their IRS settlements 
until mid-trial, and (4) failing to limit Plaintiffs' expert testimony to the topics 
and evidence included in the ( already over broad) expert report. The district 
court should have excluded Plaintiffs' expert for any and all of these failures, 
and, had it done so, Defendants would have prevailed at trial as a matter of law. 
The district court also erred in awarding Plaintiffs over $1,000,000 in pre-
judgment interest. That decision is inconsistent with this court's decision in USA 
Power, LLC v. PacifiCorp, 2016 UT 20, ,Il00, 372 P.3d 629. 
2 
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As to Plaintiffs' cross-appeal with respect to Jury Instruction 13, the district 
court did not abuse its discretion by including a non-exclusive list of factors in its 
definition of "offer or sale." [R.6826.] It is undisputed that this case involved the 
things described in the factors: private placement memoranda, subscription 
agreements, presentations, market analysis, and negotiations. But even if some of 
the factors were factually or legally inappropriate, Plaintiffs cannot establish 
prejudice in light of the district court's careful wording of the remainder of the 
instruction (which was proposed by Plaintiffs, and to which Plaintiffs did not 
object). 
Argument 
1. The district court erred in its interpretation of amended rule 26 
The expert disclosure Plaintiffs submitted for Mr .. Oveson did not comply 
with rule 26. The disclosure was deficient in three ways: (1) it contained only a 
list of general topics rather than the required brief summary of Mr. Oveson' s 
expected opinions, (2) it did not list damages as a topic on which Mr. Oveson 
~ was expected to testify, and (3) it did not include all information and materials 
that Mr. Oveson relied on in forming his opinions or reaching his damage 
calculations. [Op.Br. at 26-27; R.4806-08.] Because the disclosure did not comply 
with rule 26, the court should not have permitted Mr. Oveson to provide his 
undisclosed opinions regarding Defendants to the jury, particularly regarding 
damages. Utah R. Civ. P. 26(d)(4). Plaintiffs' arguments with respect to 
3 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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preservation, the adequacy of the disclosures, and the absence of harm lack 
merit. 
1.1 The issues are preserved 
Plaintiffs' preservation arguments lack merit. [Resp.Br. at 23-24.] "[l]ssues 
must be preserved, not arguments for or against a particular ruling on an issue 
raised below." Gressman v. State, 2013 UT 63, ,I45, 323 P.3d 998. "An issue is 
preserved for appeal when it has been presented to the district court in such a 
way that the court has an opportunity to rule on [it]." Id. (quotations omitted). 
Defendants raised this issue to the district court, arguing that Plaintiffs' expert 
disclosures were deficient, that the omissions were not harmless and were 
without good cause, and that Plaintiffs' experts should therefore be barred from 
testifying at trial or in any hearing [R.4783-84;4797.] The district court had the 
opportunity to rule on this issue, as was required for preservation. [R.5240.] 
1.2 Plaintiffs' arguments regarding harm are without merit 
As an initial matter, Plaintiffs assert that Defendants have not shown harm 
because they have not established on appeal how the result would have been 
different had the district court properly interpreted rule 26 and prevented 
Mr. Oveson from testifying. [Resp.Br. at 22-24.] This assertion is puzzling. 
Without Mr. Oveson, Plaintiffs had no expert. [R.4804-09.] And without expert 
testimony, especially expert testimony concerning damages, Plaintiffs would 
have lacked the testimony necessary to establish the elements of their 
4 
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malpractice claim. Just as the district court dismissed the malpractice claim for 
2007 when Mr. Oveson withdrew his damage calculation for 2007, [R.9553;7805-
06;7809-11 ], the district court would have had to dismiss the malpractice claim in 
its entirety. It is difficult to understand what more is required to demonstrate 
prejudice. 
In addition, Plaintiffs ignore the fact that Plainti.ffs had the burden to 
demonstrate that their inadequate disclosure for Mr. Oveson did not harm 
Defendants. Utah R. Civ. P. 26(d)(4) & advisory committee notes ("If a party fails 
to disclose or to supplement timely its discovery responses, that party cannot use 
the undisclosed witness, document, or material, at any hearing or trial, absent 
proof that non-disclosure was harmless or justified by good cause." (emphases 
added)); Dahl v. Harrison, 2011 UT App 389, ,r22, 265 P.3d 139 (explaining "the 
sanction of exclusion is automatic and mandatory unless the sanctioned party can 
show that the violation of rule 26(a) was either justified or harmless"). 
The Utah Court of Appeals recently determined that, under amended rule 
IJ) 26, "[a]n insufficient disclosure by one party does not shift the burden and risk to 
resolve the insufficient disclosure to the other party .... " RJW Media Inc. v. 
Heath, 2017 UT App 34, if 29, -- P.3d --. Instead, "[a] disclosing party who 
endeavors, by stratagem or otherwise, to disclose as little as possible faces a 
significant risk that the disclosure will be found insufficient and the evidence or 
the witness may not be allowed. To minimize this risk, disclosing parties should 
5 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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be liberally forthcoming rather than minimally compliant and risk the possible 
consequences of testimony exclusion." Id. if 30. 
Plaintiffs now contend that Defendants had to show that they would have 
chosen a deposition if the disclosure for Mr. Oveson had complied with rule 26, 
that they sought to change their election or sought an additional deposition, or 
that the inadequate disclosure adversely affected their own expert's testimony. 
[Resp.Br. at 24.] But the burden was not on Defendants to do any of these things. 
The burden was on Plaintiffs to provide adequate disclosure under rule 26 or to 
demonstrate that their failure was harmless or for good cause. Utah R. Civ. P. 26 
advisory committee notes. Defendants timely objected to the inadequacy of 
Plaintiffs' disclosures, and also filed a petition to appeal from the interlocutory 
order denying their motion. [R.5252-53.] Nothing more was required. 
Plaintiffs also assert that Defendants were not harmed because they 
elected a full expert report rather than a deposition prior to the district court 
ruling on Defendants' motion. [Resp.Br. at 24.] But this is irrelevant. Rule 26 
mandates that a party elect either a deposition or a full written report within 
seven days of receiving the expert disclosure. Utah R. Civ. P. 26(a)(4)(C)(i). It is 
unreasonable to think that Defendants would risk missing out on expert 
discovery from Mr. Oveson altogether by forgoing their election. As a result of 
Plaintiffs' inadequate disclosure, Defendants had to make their election between 
a full report and a deposition without having received the summary of expert 
6 
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testimony required by rule 26. Plaintiffs' inadequate disclosure for Mr. Oveson 
was not harmless. Defendants were left to proceed with discovery, the retention 
of their experts, the preparation of their expert reports, and the preparation for 
trial without the required summary of Mr. Oveson' s opinions and without any 
indication that Plaintiffs would provide expert testimony on damages. If these 
things do not constitute harm, then it is hard to imagine when a party's failure to 
comply with the new disclosure requirements would be considered harmful. 
And if such failures are never considered harmful, it's hard to imagine how the 
amended rules' purpose of front-loading the discovery process will ever be 
fulfilled, because failure to meet the requirements will always be considered 
inconsequential. 
RJW Media held that the failure of a party to comply with amended rule 26 
was harmless u[b]ecause [the expert's] testimony was cumulative of evidence 
admitted from other sources, ... [ and therefore the court's] confidence in the trial 
court's ultimate decision here is not undermined." 2017 UT App 34, if 34. That is 
not the case here. Mr. Oveson' s testimony was not cumulative; he was the only 
expert witness who could testify about professional duties and the only witness 
who could testify about damages. [R.4804-09.] And none of Plaintiffs' disclosures 
gave any indication that any witness would be testifying regarding damages. 
[Id.] In light of these circumstances, this court should reject Plaintiffs' assertions 
that Defendants failed to demonstrate harm. 
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1.3 Plaintiffs' expert disclosures did not comply with amended rule 26 
Because the harm caused by the failure to exclude Mr. Oveson's testimony 
is apparent, the issue on appeal hinges upon whether the district court correctly 
interpreted and applied the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, an issue this court 
reviews for correctness. Nunley v. Westates Casing Servs., Inc., 1999 UT 100, if 42, 
989 P.2d 1077. Rule 26, amended in 2011, requires parties to provide disclosures 
for expert witnesses, which must contain "a brief summary of the opinions to 
which the witness is expected to testify," as well as "all data and other 
information that will be relied upon by the witness in forming those opinions." 
Utah R. Civ. P. 26(a)(4)(A). "If a party fails to disclose or to supplement timely a 
disclosure or response to discovery, that party may not use the undisclosed 
witness, document or material at any hearing or trial unless the failure is 
harmless or the party shows good cause for the failure." Id. R. 26(d)(4). 
The advisory committee notes "merit great weight in any interpretation of 
those rules." Burns v. Boyden, 2006 UT 14, ifl8 n.6, 133 P.3d 370. And the 
committee notes make clear that "[n]ot being able to use evidence that a party 
fails properly to disclose provides a powerful incentive to make complete 
disclosures," but "[t]his is true only if trial courts hold parties to this standard." 
Utah R. Civ. P. 26 advisory committee notes." Accordingly, although a trial court 
retains discretion to determine how properly to address this issue in a given case, 
the usual and expected result should be exclusion of the evidence." Id. (emphasis 
added). 
8 
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Indeed, as pointed out by the court of appeals, the committee notes 
"explain[] that the 'may not use' language of rule 26 . . . provides for a 
mandatory preclusion of materials, not a permissive sanction." Baumann v. The 
Kroger Co., 2016 UT App 165, ,rs n.5, 381 P.3d 1135, cert. granted, 384 P.3d 566 
(Utah 2016); see also Dahl v. Harrison, 2011 UT App 389, ,r22, 265 P.3d 139 ("[T]he 
sanction of exclusion is automatic and mandatory unless the sanctioned party can 
show that the violation of rule 26(a) was either justified or harmless." (discussing 
precursor rule 37(£) (emphasis added)). 
In RJW Media, Inc., the Utah Court of Appeals provided the first appellate 
consideration of the sufficiency of the required summary of expected opinions in 
an expert disclosure under amended rule 26. 2017 UT App 34, ,r22, ---P.3d ---. 
The court of appeals concluded that the summary must contain "some disclosure 
of expected opinion and fact testimony that is more than ... broad, conclusory 
statements." Id. if24 (quotations omitted). The expert disclosure at issue did not 
satisfy rule 26 because the party "disclosed nothing but general topics on which 
the expert might opine," just as in this case. Id. if 27. 
The RJW Media decision tracks the language of rule 26 and the advisory 
committee notes. It also furthers the purposes of amended rule 26, which are to 
"reduce discovery costs" and ensure that parties are provided with "basic 
information concerning the subjects about which the witness is expected to 
testify at trial, so that the other side may determine the witness's relative 
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importance in the case, [including] whether the witness should be interviewed or 
deposed." Utah R. Civ. P. 26 advisory committee notes. 
Unlike this case, RJW Media dealt with the adequacy of disclosure for a 
non-retained expert. 2017 UT App 34, 17. But the requirements for a non-
retained expert are lower than that of a retained expert, and the court of appeals 
still concluded that it was insufficient to merely provide general topics without 
the opinions to which the expert was expected to testify. Id. 127. The court of 
appeals explained that even with uncooperative non-retained experts, a party 
must disclose "any opinion testimony that a party expects to elicit from them at 
trial." Id. 131 (quotation omitted). While a party may not know how exactly a 
non-retained expert will testify, "the rule does not require parties to disclose the 
testimony that they know will be offered, but rather, what they expect to elicit." Id. 
132 (emphases in original). Thus, even with uncooperative non-retained experts, 
a summary of the witness's expected opinions must be provided- a list of 
general topics is not enough. 
Here, Mr. Oveson was not an uncooperative non-retained expert. He was a 
retained expert. Plaintiffs had complete access to Mr .. Oveson to garner the 
information necessary to fulfill the requirements of amended rule 26. Yet as in 
RJW Media, Plaintiffs did not provide a summary of Mr. Oveson' s expected 
opinions, and instead provided "nothing but general topics on which the expert 
might opine." Id. 127. 
10 
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Specifically, Plaintiffs' disclosure for Mr. Oveson stated that "Mr. Oveson 
will provide an analysis of relevant issues in this case, including, but not limited 
to, the following." [R.4806.] Plaintiffs then listed four topic areas of general 
duties of accountants, without any summary of what Mr. Oveson' s opinion 
would be regarding how any of these duties applied to Defendants or the actions 
at issue in this case. [R.4806-07.] The fifth point in the disclosure states "[t]hat at 
least the following actions alleged in the complaint implicate Defendants' ethical 
duties to Plaintiffs and the standard of care and professional competence 
required of accountants in Utah," and then listed "[a]ccepting commissions or 
contingency fees from third parties for referring Plaintiffs" and "[a]dvising 
Plaintiffs to enter the oil and gas transactions" in 2007 and 2008. [R.4807 
(emphasis added).] 
Nowhere did the expert disclosure explain what Mr. Oveson's opinions 
would be. It stated only that certain activities "implicate" ethical duties and 
standards of care, but gave no indication of (1) whether Defendants had 
breached their duties of care, (2) whether any breach proximately caused harm to 
Plaintiffs, and if so, (3) the resulting amount of damages. Mr. Oveson' s testimony 
regarding Defendants should not have been permitted where the expert 
disclosure failed to provide a summary of his expected opinions. 
Indeed, the disclosure did not even list damages as a topic area. [R.4806-
08.] If listing "general topics" without providing the required summary of 
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expected opinion is insufficient under rule 26, RJW Media, 2017 UT App 34, if 27, 
failing to list a topic at all surely renders a disclosure deficient under rule 26. No 
testimony should have been permitted concerning a topic not even listed on the 
expert disclosure. 
Further, instead of listing "all data and other information that will be 
relied upon by the witness in forming those opinions," as required by rule 26, 
Plaintiffs' disclosure provided only a cursory, non-specific, and non-exclusive list 
of materials. [R.4806-08.] With respect to damages, Mr. Oveson did not provide 
any of the data on which he would rely to make his calculations, including 
failing to list tax returns for any Plaintiffs for any of the years in question, or 
applications for refunds in 2008 that show the benefits received by Plaintiffs in 
the years in question. [Id.; Def. Ex. 40, 48.] 
In sum, the district court erred in its interpretation and application of 
amended rule 26. The expert disclosure for Mr. Oveson did not comply with 
amended rule 26, and his testimony should have been excluded. If it had been 
excluded, there is not just a reasonable likelihood of a different outcome, but a 
virtual certainty of a different outcome. This court should reverse. 
2. Mr. Oveson's expert report, and the proposed testimony it contained, 
should have been excluded because his report went beyond Plaintiffs' 
expert disclosures under rule 26 and did not comport with rule 702 
Defendants argue that Mr. Oveson's expert report should have been 
excluded both because it went beyond Plaintiffs' expert disclosures under rule 26 
12 
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and because it does not satisfy the standards of rule 702. This part will 
(1) demonstrate that the issues are preserved, (2) address why Mr. Oveson's 
expert report and proposed testimony should have been excluded under rule 26, 
and (3) explain why Mr. Oveson' s expert report and proposed testimony also 
should have been excluded under rule 702. 
2.1 The issues are preserved 
Plaintiffs contend that Defendants did not preserve the issues raised here. 
[Resp.Br. at 28-29.]1 However, the issues are preserved-they were presented to 
the district court and the court had an opportunity to rule. Gressman, 2013 UT 63, 
,r4S. As Plaintiffs acknowledge in their response brief, although Defendants cited 
the wrong document, Defendants did indeed file a motion to strike the testimony 
of Mr. Oveson, in which Defendants argued that Mr. Oveson' s report and 
proposed testimony should be excluded under rule 26 and rule 702.2 [Resp.Br. at 
1 Plaintiffs point out that Defendants cited the wrong motion in the 
~ opening brief. [Resp.Br. at 27-28.] In the preservation section of the opening 
brief, Defendants inadvertently cited to Defendants' motion to exclude the 
testimony of Plaintiff's expert Wayne Klein [R.5330-32], the document in the 
record immediately following the Defendants' motion to exclude the testimony 
of Val Oveson and memorandum in support, which were the documents 
Defendants intended to cite. [R.5277-5329.] Moreover, in the argument section of 
the opening brief, Defendants at times inadvertently refer to a related "motion in 
limine" when they intended to refer to the motion to exclude the testimony of 
Mr. Oveson. [Op.Br. at 28-32.] 
2 Defendants cited Plaintiffs' opposition to Defendants' motion to exclude 
the testimony of Mr. Oveson in the argument section of the opening brief. 
[Op.Br. at 31.] 
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28;R.5277-5329; 6022-38.] The district co~rt ruled on the issues. [Resp.Br. at 
28;R.8791-92.] 
Moreover, in the preservation section of the opening brief where 
Defendants made the citation error, Defendants also cited a motion in limine 
regarding the nature and scope of Plaintiffs' expert testimony and memorandum 
in support. [Op.Br. at 4; R.5502-07.] Defendants there argued that an opinion 
must be set forth in both the disclosure and report to comply with rule 26. 
[R.5505.] And in the preservation section, Defendants cited the minute entry in 
which the district court denied that motion. [Op.Br. at 4; R.6279.] 
Plaintiffs also contend that Defendants made different arguments to the 
district court as to why the report did not satisfy the requirements of rule 702 
than they make on appeal. Again, "[i]ssues must be preserved, not arguments for 
or against a particular ruling on an issue raised below." Gressman, 2013 UT 63, 
145. Moreover, Defendants in fact raised the same lines of argument to the 
district court as they raise on appeal. Defendants argued to the district court, 
among other things, ~at "Mr. Oveson's failure or refusal to address contrary or 
inconsistent evidence entails a complete failure to apply proper methodology by 
the expert, rendering his opinions inadmissible." [R.5318-19;5278.] Defendants 
likewise complained to the district court that Mr. "Oveson seems to have 
inferred from the fact of investment and the total investment, that the investment 
was necessarily the amount of damages, but there is no analysis supporting that 
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conclusion." [R.5323.] And Defendants pointed out to the district court that Mr. 
"Oveson never reviewed the Plaintiffs' tax returns and so is not in a position to 
say what tax benefits were realized when." [R.5328.] 
In the opening brief, Defendants argued that "Plaintiffs cannot meet the 
rule 702 threshold of demonstrating that his opinion relied on sufficient facts or 
data or a methodology that has been reliably applied to the facts of the case." 
[Op.Br. at 32.] Specifically, Defendants pointed out that "[r]ather than calculating 
the benefits [Plaintiffs] received to reach a net financial impact of the 
investment ... , Mr. Oveson simply concluded that the Plaintiffs were entitled to 
the return of their entire investment because the Plaintiffs had not been able to 
use all of the combined losses on their 2008 tax returns." [Id. at 31.] And 
Defendants pointed out that "Mr. Oveson did not even look at all the available 
tax returns before opining that the tax benefits that Plaintiffs had received, or 
would receive, could not be quantified." [Id.] The issues are preserved. 
2.2 Mr. Oveson's expert report and proposed testimony should have 
been excluded under rule 26 
Mr. Oveson' s expert report went well beyond what was set forth in 
Plaintiffs' disclosures. Specifically, the report sets forth Mr. Oveson's opinions 
regarding Defendants [R.4806-08], which, as discussed in Part 1 above, were not 
summarized in the expert disclosures for Mr. Oveson. [R.5288-5305.] Most 
significantly, in his report, Mr. Oveson opined on damages, even though 
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damages was not a topic listed in Plaintiffs' expert disclosures for Mr. Oveson. 
[R.5304-05;4806-08.] 
In Defendants' motion to exclude Mr. Oveson's testimony, Defendants 
argued that the report and proposed testimony should be excluded because the 
opinions were "materially different" from the "topics of analysis" set forth in 
Plaintiffs' expert disclosures for Mr. Oveson. [R.5320-21.] Defendants argued 
that the report went beyond disclosure topics, failed to address certain topics 
listed in the disclosure, and introduced topics not included in the disclosure. 
[R.5321-22.] Most significantly, Defendants objected to the expert report 
including opinions on damages, because there was no suggestion in the expert 
disclosures for Mr. Oveson that he would opine on damages. [R.5321.] The 
district court denied the motion and did not exclude the expert report and 
proposed testimony.3 [R.6279;8791-92.] 
A district court's interpretation and application of the rules of civil 
procedure presents a question of law that this court reviews for correctness. 
3 In denying Defendants' motion to strike the testimony of Mr. Oveson, the 
district court said that if experts were "totally outside of anything they have said 
in that report, I'll entertain that objection at trial." [R.8792.] But when Defendants 
objected at trial to Mr. Oveson' s testimony on the basis that it went beyond the 
scope of Plaintiffs' expert disclosures and report, specifically in his consideration 
of tax returns and other documents not disclosed in his report, the court allowed 
Mr. Oveson' s testimony to continue. [R.9569;9574-75.] Thus, as discussed in part 
3 of this brief, the district court's error in interpreting the rules to allow a report 
that exceeded the scope of the expert disclosures was compounded by the district 
court allowing trial testimony that went even beyond the report. 
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Nunley v. Westates Casing Servs., Inc., 1999 UT 100, if 42,989 P.2d 1077. Rule 
26( a) ( 4) ( A) requires that expert disclosures provide "a brief summary of the 
opinions to which the witness is expected to testify," as well as "all data and 
other information that will be relied upon by the witness in forming those 
opinions." Utah R. Civ P. 26(a)(4)(A). And, "[i]f a party fails to disclose or to 
supplement timely a disclosure or response to discovery, that party may not use 
the undisclosed witness, document or material at any hearing or trial unless the 
failure is harmless or the party shows good cause for the failure." Utah R. Civ. P. 
26( d)(4). Thus, under rule 26, an expert may not include proposed testimony in 
an expert report that was not included in the expert disclosures. 
In this case, the district court should have stricken the opinions in 
Mr. Oveson's expert report because Plaintiffs elected to include only a list of 
general topics in their expert disclosure for Mr. Oveson, rather than a summary 
of his expected opinion regarding Defendants, as required by rule 26(a)(4)(B). 
[R.4806-08;5303-05.] In particular, because Plaintiffs did not list damages as a 
viP topic in their disclosure for Mr. Oveson, the district court may not permit the 
proposed testimony in the report regarding damages. [R.4806-08;5304-05.] 
By permitting the expert report and proposed testimony of Mr. Oveson, 
which went beyond the expert disclosure, the district court erred in interpreting 
the requirements of rule 26. 
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2.3 Mr. Oveson's expert report and proposed testimony should have 
been excluded under rule 702 
The district court abused its discretion in denying Defendants' motion to 
exclude Mr. Oveson' s report under rule 702. [R.8791-92.] Defendants have 
already set forth the standard for determining whether evidence satisfies the 
requirements of rule 702 in the opening brief. [Op.Br. at 30-31.] Here, the proper 
methodology was to determine the tax benefits Plaintiffs received from the tax 
losses generated _by their 2008 investments and then subtract that value from the 
gross amount Plaintiffs invested in 2008. [Op.Br. at 31.] Indeed, Mr. Oveson's 
report concludes damages can only be calculated by taking the original 
investment of Plaintiffs, plus loan guarantees, less tax savings, less settlement 
against Feldman. [R.5304.] Likewise, in Plaintiffs' memorandum in opposition to 
Defendants' motion to exclude testimony of Mr. Oveson, Plaintiffs explained that 
Mr. Oveson's "methodology in computing [damages] is so straightforward-
adding up all the costs to the Plaintiffs and subtracting the benefits they received 
to reach a net financial impact of the inveshnent." [R.5833.] 
But in the damage calculation given in his report, Mr. Oveson inexplicably 
attributed "$0" to tax savings. [R.5304.] In a footnote, Mr. Oveson states, 
J'/Because Plaintiffs had other business losses on their 2007 and 2008 tax returns 
the promised tax savings from the oil and gas investments by Defendants were 
not realized. Future benefit from the Net Operating Losses claimed by reason of 
the oil and gas inveshnents in the future cannot be quantified nor is the benefit 
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certain." [R.5304 n.2.] Yet Mr. Oveson provided no basis for his contention that 
future tax benefits were unquantifiable or uncertain. And he provided no basis 
for ignoring Plaintiffs other sources of tax losses, which are fungible for tax 
purposes. [Op.Br. at 18, 31 n.3.] Moreover, although losses could be carried 
forward or carried back to provide savings in other years, Mr. Oveson never 
reviewed tax returns from other years to deterrrtlne if ( as was in fact the case) the 
2008 investments had resulted in tax savings in other years.4 Indeed, Mr. Oveson 
acknowledged at trial that it was "absolutely correct" that his failure to consider 
future tax returns, and thus the benefits actually received by each of the Plaintiffs 
on those tax returns, rendered his opinion on damages "speculative." [R.9628.] 
In short, Mr. Oveson did not demonstrate how his opinions regarding 
damages were grounded in and connected to the facts of the case. His 
calculations were not based upon sufficient facts and data, and his methods were 
not reliably applied to the facts of the case. Accordingly, the district court should 
have excluded Mr. Oveson' s report and proposed testimony under rule 702. 
3. The district court erred in interpreting rule 26 as allowing Mr. Oveson to 
go beyond his expert report at trial 
Plaintiffs argue that Mr. Oveson's trial testimony did not contain any 
testimony not included in his report. [R.29-30,36.] Plaintiffs are incorrect. 
4 As discussed in part 3, Mr. Oveson later attempted to cure this defect by 
reviewing tax returns for other years prior to testifying at trial. [R.9569.] But his 
reliance on tax returns for other years was not disclosed in his expert disclosures 
or expert report. [R.4806-08;5292.] 
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At trial, Defendants objected to Mr. Oveson's testimony on the basis that it 
went beyond the scope of his expert disclosure and report. [R.9569;9574-75.] 
Specifically, Defendants pointed out that "his consideration of tax returns was 
nowhere disclosed in his report'' and that Defendants' ability to cross-examine 
was prejudiced by this surprise testimony. [R.9569.] Defendants then made a 
"continuing objection" to testimony emerging that was not in Mr. Oveson's 
report, arguing that they had no opportunity to prepare for such testimony. 
[R.9574.] In response, Plaintiffs argued that Mr. Oveson should be permitted to 
rely on the evidence presented at trial in giving his testimony, rather than being 
limited to what was set forth in his disclosures and report. [R.9574-75.] The court 
accepted Plaintiffs' argument and allowed Mr. Oveson to base his damages 
opinion on tax returns that were not disclosed in his report. [R.9569;9574-75.] 
Rule 26 requires that an expert report "shall contain a complete statement of 
all opinions the expert will offer at trial and the basis and reasons for them." Utah 
R. Civ. P. 26(a)(4)(B) (emphases added). The advisory committee notes explain 
that "[t]he intent is not to require a verbatim transcript of exactly what the expert ~ 
will say at trial," but that" the expert must fairly disclose the substance of and 
basis for each opinion the expert will offer." Utah R. Civ. P. 26 advisory 
committee notes. "[A]n expert may not testify in a party's case-in-chief 
concerning any matter not fairly disclosed in the report." Utah R. Civ. P. 
26(a)(4)(B). The notes make clear that "[t]o achieve the goal of making reports a 
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reliable substitute for depositions, courts are expected to enforce this 
requirement." Utah R. Civ. P. advisory committee notes. 
The district court's conclusion that expert reports are a summary and, 
more important, its decision to allow testimony beyond the report-even 
evidence not disclosed in the report- directly conflicts with the language of 
amended rule 26. The district court's interpretation also defeats the purpose of 
amended rule 26. Because the court allowed Mr. Oveson to go beyond his report 
in his testimony, his expert report did not serve as a "reliable substitute for [a] 
deposition[]." Utah R. Civ. P. 26 advisory committee note. 
This is particularly problematic with regard to Mr. Oveson's damage 
calculations. As discussed above, Plaintiffs' expert disclosure did not indicate 
that Mr. Oveson would opine on damages. [R.4806-08.] Mr. Oveson went 
beyond the expert disclosure to opine on damages in his report, but his report 
did not indicate that he had reviewed Plaintiffs' tax returns. [R.5292;5304-05.] 
After submitting his report, Mr. Oveson listened to the evidence at trial 
~ and concluded that his opinion on 2007 damages was "wrong" and" ought not to 
be submitted to the jury," presumably because he failed to analyze Plaintiffs' 
2007 tax returns. [R.9549, 9550.] Even though Mr. Oveson's opinion with respect 
to 2008 similarly failed to consider the relevant tax returns, he sought to cure 
deficiencies in his damage calculations by relying on additional evidence, which 
was not disclosed in his report. [R.9569 (relying on Plaintiffs' 2007 and 2008 tax 
21 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
returns, even though he did not disclose them in his report);9574-75(relying on 
IRS Circular 230, even though he did not disclose in his report);9627(relying on 
Plaintiffs' 2009-2012 tax returns, even though he did not disclose them in his 
report).] Defendants had no notice or preparation for responding to 
Mr. Oveson's new reasons for concluding that Plaintiffs were entitled to a full 
refund of their investment. [R.9552-53.] The district court erred in interpreting 
rule 26 as allowing Mr. Oveson to present these new opinions on damages at 
trial. The court should reverse on this additional ground. 
4. The district court abused its discretion in failing to dismiss Plaintiffs' 
accounting malpractice claim in its entirety as a sanction for Plaintiffs 
failing to disclose their settlements with the IRS 
Plaintiffs argue that the district court dismissed the 2007 claims as a 
sanction and that Defendants "proposed" this solution. [Resp.Br. at 38-41.] 
Plaintiffs are incorrect on both counts. 
First, although district courts "are given broad discretion regarding the 
imposition of discovery sanctions," a court abuses its discretion when choosing 
which sanction to impose if there is "an erroneous conclusion of law or ... no 
evidentiary basis for the trial court's ruling." Morton v. Cont'l Baking Co., 938 P.2d 
271,274 (Utah 1997) (quotations omitted). 
Here, there is no evidentiary basis for the district court's decision not to 
dismiss the malpractice claim in its entirety, thus imposing no sanction at all on 
Plaintiffs for their egregious discovery violation. Although the district court 
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dismissed Plaintiffs' malpractice claim for 2007, this sanction is a mirage, as 
dismissal of the claim for 2007 was already mandated by Plaintiffs' concession 
that it had no evidence of damages for 2007, an essential element of the claim. 
[R.9553.] Plaintiffs acknowledged that Mr. Oveson's damages report was fatally 
flawed independently of the fact that the undisclosed settlement came to light 
mid-trial. [R.9549-50 (admitting that Mr. Oveson' s report was "wrong and ought 
not to be submitted to the jury," and that that issue was" altogether" "unrelated" 
to the settlement issue).] 
Further, it is equally clear that the failure to disclose the 2007 settlements 
prejudiced Defendants' ability to defend the 2008 claims. The district court 
recognized that the settlements changed the entire case mid-trial, noting "the fact 
that defendants thought there was no settlement went deeply to their strategy, 
and ... that's pretty clear from the testimony that they have elicited on cross." 
[R.9552.] And even though the fact of settlement was disclosed mid-trial, not 
even Plaintiffs' counsel knew the terms of the settlements, because Plaintiffs' tax 
~ counsel failed to respond to any of trial counsel's phone calls and emails, and 
had failed to forward the settlements even though they were consummated 
months before trial. [R.9533;9548 (noting that one of the settlements was entered 
into five months prior to trial).] The district court then noted: 
I'm going to find that [ the non-disclosure] affects how they cross-
examine the [plaintiffs], how they cross examine the [plaintiff's 
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expert],5 and dramatic changes in that cross-exarrtination on the-in 
the middle of trial are - would be required. You - they still do not 
have the actual settlement paperwork for the plaintiffs' tax attorney. 
[R.9552.] 
The record makes clear that Plaintiffs agreed with Defendants that 
sanctions were warranted for Plaintiffs' failure to disclose their IRS settlements. 
[R.9539-40;9544-45]. Moreover, the district court ruled that sanctions were 
warranted and that Plaintiffs' failure to disclose IRS settlements "severely 
prejudice[ d] the Bloomfield Defendants' ability to defend the malpractice claims 
against them." [R. 7810;9552.] Under these circumstances, the district court 
abused its discretion by only dismissing Plaintiffs' unsupported ( and already 
voluntarily withdrawn) 2007 claims as a "sanction" for Plaintiffs' severely 
prejudicial acts. [R.9538.] 
Second, Plaintiffs misstate the record in arguing that Defendants 
"proposed" the sanction imposed. [Resp.Br. at 40.] When the settlements were 
revealed mid-trial, Defendants asked for the "accounting malpractice claim to be 
dismissed with prejudice." [R.9384.] In response to Plaintiffs' argument that a 
limiting instruction would suffice, Defendants' counsel emphasized that, at a 
minimum, the 2007 claims would need to be dismissed. [R.9387.] Then, after 
Plaintiffs revealed that Mr. Oveson would be withdrawing his opinion as to 2007 
s The transcript reads "defendants," but it is clear fr~m the context that the 
district court is addressing the defendant's ability to cross-examine the 
"plaintiffs." [R.9552.] 
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damages, Defendants' counsel noted that "if the expert is no longer offering that 
opinion," then "there are no damages available for any investments made in 
2007." [R.9388.] 
The following day, the district court took the matter up again in light of 
the severity of Plaintiffs' non-disclosure. [R. 9531-54.] After it became clear that 
dismissal of the 2007 claim would be necessary in light of Plaintiffs' inability to 
establish damages absent Mr. Oveson's testimony, Defendants went on to argue 
that dismissal of the malpractice claim for 2007 was not a sufficient cure for the 
failure to disclose the IRS settlements. [R.9537-38 ("[W]e think the whole claim 
for malpractice has to go, that the taint covers the entire claim.").] Thus, the 
record demonstrates that Defendants consistently requested that the malpractice 
claim be dismissed in its entirety as a sanction for Plaintiffs' failure to disclose 
settlement with the IRS. [R.9537-38.] Plaintiffs' assertion of invited error is 
untethered to the record, which demonstrates that the district court's sanction 
was not proposed by Defendants, and was meaningless in light of the legal 
~ defects in Plaintiffs' 2007 claims. [Resp.Br. at 40-41.] This court should reverse. 
5. The evidence at trial was insufficient to support the jury's award of 
damages in the full amount of Plaintiffs' 2008 investment 
Plaintiffs contend that the sufficiency of the evidence issue is not 
preserved, and in any event, that the jury verdict was supported by sufficient 
evidence at trial. [Resp.Br. at 41-46.] Defendants will address each in tum. 
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5.1 The issue is preserved 
In the district court, Defendants filed a motion under rule 50, requesting 
judgment as a matter of law on the basis that Plaintiffs had not presented 
sufficient evidence of damages, or in the alternative, requesting a new trial, and 
the district court denied both requests. [R.7224-25;7230-32;7238-40;7794-98.] 
Thus, the issue is preserved. 
Nevertheless, Plaintiffs advance three arguments in support of their view 
that the sufficiency issue was unpreserved: (1) Defendants mis-cited the record in 
the preservation section, (2) Defendants did not make a separate motion under 
rule 59, and (3) Defendants did not make identical arguments to those made to 
the district court. 
First, although Defendants inadvertently mis-cited the record in the 
preservation section of the opening brief, in the argument section Defendants 
cited the district court's ruling, which denied Defendants' motion for judgment 
as a matter of law under rule 50 and alternative request for a new trial under rule 
59. [Op.Br. at 38;R.7797.] There is no question that Defendants presented this 
issue to the district court in such a way that the district court had the opportunity 
' 
to rule on it. 
Second, it is true that Defendants did not make a separate motion under 
rule 59. [Resp.Br. at 43.] But a separate motion is not required because rule 50 
expressly provides that "a moving party may file a renewed motion for 
judgment as a matter of law and may include an alternative or joint request for a 
26 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
new trial under Rule 59." Utah R. Civ. P. S0(b). Accordingly, in their rule 50 
motion, Defendants included an alternative request for a new trial. [R.7225.] The 
court properly construed this as a request for a new trial under rule 59 and 
denied the request. [R.7797.] 
Third, while Plaintiffs contend that the issue is not preserved because 
Defendants made different arguments to the district court, again it is "[i]ssues 
[that] must be preserved, not arguments for or against a particular ruling on an 
issue raised below." Gressman, 2013 UT 63, ,l45. Moreover, the thrust of 
Defendants' argument to the district court was the same as that made on appeal. 
To the district court, Defendants argued that "Plaintiffs' theory of damages is 
that, although they received the tax deductions that they expected from the 
operating losses of the Partnerships, they were unable to use all of those 
deductions in 2008. This theory does not yield any actual losses." [R.7230.] 
Moreover, "[a]s of their 2012 tax returns, all of Plaintiffs had used all of the 
deductions they received from the investments. That means that Plaintiffs have 
vii no damages at all-they received all and exactly the benefits they expected from 
their investments in the Partnerships." [R. 7240.] 
On appeal, Defendants likewise argue that Plaintiffs did not prove actual 
losses and there is therefore insufficient evidence to support the jury's award of 
damages in the full amount of Plaintiffs' 2008 investments. [Op.Br. at 38-49.] 
Plaintiffs' preservation arguments all fail. 
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5.2 The evidence at trial was insufficient to support the jury's award 
Plaintiffs' argument that Mr. Oveson was not required to account for the 
benefits Plaintiffs received from carrying back and carrying forward losses from 
their 2008 investments is inconsistent with Utah law. [Resp.Br. at 45-46.] 
Damages are a necessary element of an accounting malpractice claim. Clark v. 
Deloitte & Touche LLP, 2001 UT 90, if22, 34 P.3d 209. Plaintiffs were required to 
prove both the fact of damages and the amount of damages. Atkin Wright & Miles 
v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 709 P.2d 330,336 (Utah 1985). To prove the 
amount of damages requires "sufficient evidence to enable the trier of fact to 
make a reasonable approximation." Cook Assocs., Inc. v. Warnick, 664 P.2d 1161, 
1167 (Utah 1983). "What constitutes such an approximation will vary with the 
circumstances. Greater accuracy is required in cases where highly probative 
evidence is easy to obtain than in cases where such evidence is unavailable." Id. 
As set forth in the opening brief, this court has consistently held that a 
decrease in gross income or gross profits, without evidence of net loss, is not an 
adequate measure of damages. See, e.g., Atkin Wright, 709 P.2d at 336; Sawyers v. 
FMA Leasing Co., 722 P.2d 773, 774 (Utah 1986). In other words, relevant gains 
must be subtracted from losses in order to establish damages. Such a standard is 
necessary to ensure that injured parties are compensated for actual losses and not 
given a windfall. Plaintiffs claim these cases are not applicable, but provide no 
explanation for why the principles underlying the cases do not apply here. 
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Applying the principles underlying these cases here, Plaintiffs' claim for 
damages fails as a matter of law because Plaintiffs' expert made no effort to 
calculate the benefits Plaintiffs received by carrying the losses from their 2008 
investments forward and backwards on their tax returns in other years. As a 
brief recap of the evidence marshalled and discussed extensively in the opening 
brief, the only claim for damages against Defendants is based on Plaintiffs' 
alleged failure to realize the tax benefits of their 2008 investments on their 2008 
tax returns [Op.Br. at 42;R.6890-99.] But Plaintiffs were permitted to carry those 
losses back for three years (to 2005) and forward for twenty years (to 2028), until 
the losses were exhausted. [Op.Br. at 42;R.5324.] Determining the value of the tax 
benefits of the 2008 investments required analysis of tax returns and 
amendments filed for 2005-2013 and, if the losses had not been exhausted by 
2013, a prediction as to the value of the losses that could be claimed in 
subsequent years. [Op.Br. at 42-43; R.9560;9593;9601;9557.] 
Plaintiffs'· expert never attempted to calculate whether Plaintiffs used all 
~ their tax losses, and if not, what the remaining value of the unused tax losses 
was. [Op.Br. at 44;R.9905-06.] Instead, Plaintiffs' damage expert opined that 
Plaintiffs suffered damages in the entire amount of their 2008 investments, 
regardless of the actual value of the tax benefits, because Plaintiffs were unable 
to use all of the tax losses generated by the investments, as well as losses 
generated by other means, on their 2008 returns. [Op.Br. at 43;R.9593;9601-03.] 
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There is no support for Plaintiffs' theory that they could recover the entire value 
of the 2008 inveshnent regardless of the value of the tax benefits they received in 
other years from the investments. 
Nor is there any support for Plaintiffs' contention that tax benefits received 
by Plaintiffs in years other than 2008 are too "speculative" to be taken into 
account. [R.9599.] Indeed, Defendants' expert reviewed Plaintiffs' tax returns and 
concluded that all of the deductions had been used by 2012. [R.9851;9853-64.] 
Moreover, there is no basis for Plaintiffs' assertion that the tax benefits Plaintiffs 
had received were "in the process of being disallowed as part of an IRS audit." 
[Resp.Br. at 46.] Plaintiffs do not provide any record support for this assertion. 
[Id.] And there is nothing in the record to indicate that the oil and gas 
partnerships were under audit and no suggestion that Plaintiffs' 2009-2012 tax 
returns were ever audited. 
Nor is there any support for Plaintiffs' contention that the net damages 
requirement only applies in "different factual contexts" not present here. 
[Resp.Br. at 46.] Indeed, the opposite is true. Under Utah law, "[g]reater accuracy 
is required in cases where highly probative evidence is easy to obtain." Cook 
Assocs., 664 P.2d at 1167. In this case, the jury relied on Mr. Oveson's opinion that 
Plaintiffs' tax benefits were "speculative" and therefore to be completely 
discounted, even though he could have "eas[ily] ... obtain[ed]" the "highly 
probative" tax returns that would have demonstrated otherwise. Id. Plaintiffs 
30 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
offer no argument as to why Utah's net damages rule should not apply under 
these circumstances. 
Ultimately, Plaintiffs' claims fail as a matter of law because the evidence 
does not support an award of damages in the entire amount of the 2008 
investments. Accordingly, this court should hold that Defendants are entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law under rule 50 or a new trial under rule 59(a)(5) or 
(a)(6). 
6. The district court erred in awarding prejudgment interest 
A district court's decision to award prejudgment interest presents a 
question of law, which is reviewed for correctness. Encon Utah, LLC v. Fluor Ames 
Kraemer, LLC, 2009 UT 7, if 11, 210 P.3d 263. Here, the district court erred in 
awarding prejudgment interest at the rate of 10% per annum on the jury's award 
because (1) Plaintiffs' damages were not fixed as of a definite time, (2) Plaintiffs' 
damages were too speculative to allow for prejudgment interest, and (3) the rate 
of 10% per annum under Utah Code section 15-1-1 was not applicable. 
6.1 Plaintiffs' damages were not fixed as of a definite time 
Plaintiffs argue that their losses were fixed on the selected date of seven 
years prior to the entry of judgment, because Mr. Oveson testified that the 
damages suffered by Plaintiffs were equal to their cash investment in 2008 and 
that any future benefit to Plaintiffs was speculative. [Resp.Br. at 48.] Thus, 
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Plaintiffs contend that damages were fixed when Plaintiffs made their 
investments in 2008. [Id.] 
But Plaintiffs have not established that the losses were fixed at the time the 
investments were made, and they presented no evidence as to when they 
expected to receive the tax benefits associated with their 2008 investments. 
[Op.Br. at 50.] Indeed, Mr. Oveson acknowledged that the law permitted losses 
to be carried forward for twenty years for tax purposes. [R.9598.] Although Mr. 
Oveson claimed any carry-forwards were too II speculative" to take into account, 
he provided no basis for this assumption. [R.9598-99.] Indeed, by Mr. Oveson's 
own admission, certain Plaintiffs undispu tedly benefited from the carried-
forward losses in future tax years. [R.9602 (admitting that Mr. Washenko and Mr. 
Witman benefited from the tax losses generated by the investment in future 
years, yet nevertheless opining that they were entitled to damages in the full 
amount of their investments because those benefits were not realized in 2008); 
R.9645 (arguing that Mr. Lovelady was entitled to receive the full amount of his 
2008 investments, even though by 2010 Mr. Lovelady had completely exhausted 
his carried-forward losses).] 
Plaintiffs assert that Defendants' expert accountant agreed that damages 
were fixed when Plaintiffs made their investments in 2008. [Resp.Br. at 48.] But at 
the record cite Plaintiffs provide, Defendants' expert makes no such assertion. 
Instead, the expert admits only that without the deductions on their 2008 tax 
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return due to the investments at issue, none of Plaintiffs would have paid any 
different tax in 2008 because of their other business losses in 2008, including a 
change in income recognition made long after the investments at issue here. 
[R.9878.] That has nothing to do with whether Plaintiffs' damages were fixed 
when they made their investments. 
There is no evidence Plaintiffs' losses were complete as of the arbitrarily 
selected date of seven years prior to the entry of judgment. Accordingly, the 
district court erred in awarding prejudgment interest. 
6.2 Plaintiffs' damages were too speculative to support an award of 
prejudgment interest 
Plaintiffs contend that damages were not speculative because the jury was 
presented with damage calculations prepared by both sides' respective experts. 
[Resp.Br. at 49.] But it is not enough that the jury heard expert testimony 
regarding damages. "The analysis in determining the appropriateness of a 
prejudgment interest award is whether a claim ... is ascertainable with 
mathematical accuracy." Canyon Country Store v. Bracey, 781 P.2d 414, 422-23 
(Utah 1989). Indeed, a "formula" used to determine damages "may [be] sufficient 
for the jury to render a verdict in favor of [a party]," but still be "too speculative 
to allow for the addition of prejudgment interest." Id. 
Here, whether Plaintiffs suffered any damages depended on whether they 
were able to use the losses from their investments to obtain tax benefits. 
Mr. Oveson opined that it is "speculative" to assert that benefits will accrue in a 
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particular year because of the number of factors in play, including the level of 
Plaintiffs' income and other tax losses. [R. 9598-99.] In the face of such 
uncertainty and speculation, the award of prejudgment interest was not 
appropriate under the Utah standard. 
Additionally, as discussed in the opening brief, Plaintiffs' losses were 
dependent on the jury's allocation of fault of the various parties at issue. [Op.Br. 
at 52-53.] The jury apportioned 10% fault to Plaintiffs. [R.6897-98.] Under the 
Utah Code, Plaintiffs would not have been entitled to any recovery had the jury 
determined that Plaintiffs' fault exceeded the fault of Defendants and nonparties. 
Utah Code § 78B-5-818(2). Other jurisdictions have determined prejudgment 
interest is not appropriate in such circumstances. For instance, Montana, like 
Utah, requires that damages must be fixed in time and not speculative. 
McPherson v. Schlemmer, 749 P.2d 51, 54 (Mont. 1988). And the Supreme Court of 
Montana ruled that in a scenario involving apportionment of fault, "[s]ince 
liability was contested, no monetary obligation existed until the jury determined 
the degree of comparative negligence." Id. 
Likewise, in South Dakota, "where damages are uncertain until a jury has 
reached a decision, prejudgment interest cannot lie." S. Dakota Bldg. Auth. v. 
Geiger-Berger Assocs., P.C., 414 N.W.2d 15, 21 (S.D. 1987). The Geiger-Berger court 
explained that in cases involving apportionment of fault, "[t]he uncertainty lies 
not in the damages themselves, but rather in the proportion of those damages 
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that a defendant caused, which only a jury can decide." Id. at 22. Thus, 11 [i]f the 
extent of damages caused by another are not certain, then prejudgment interest 
should not lie .... [, and s]ince a defendant cannot, with any degree of certainty, 
tender an amount of damages to a plaintiff until a jury sets the proportionate 
fault, he cannot be held responsible for prejudgment interest." Id. 
In sum, the damages Plaintiffs suffered are too speculative to allow for 
prejudgment interest. Accordingly, this court should find that the district court 
erred m granting prejudgment interest on the jury award. 
6.3 The district court erred in awarding prejudgment interest at the 
rate of 10% per annum pursuant to section 15-1-1 
As to preservation, Plaintiffs argue the issue is unpreserved because the 
Defendants changed their argument from II section 15-1-1 only applies to lawful 
contracts" to "section 15-1-1 only applies to contracts that are for loans of any 
money or goods." [Resp.Br. at 50.] Once again, Plaintiffs "misapprehend[]the 
preservation rule. 
"Issues must be preserved, not arguments for or against a particular ruling 
on an issue raised below." Gressman, 2013 UT 63, if 45. Defendants timely objected 
to Plaintiffs' proposed judgment and the district court's ruling awarding 
prejudgment interest. [R.7016-19;7803-05.] Defendants argued that "to the extent 
any prejudgment interest may be awarded, the Plaintiffs' attempt to use a 10% 
interest rate is not supported. While Utah Code§ 15-1-1 provides for a 10% 
interest rate, it does so only f?r claims relating to a 'lawful contract,' not claims of 
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professional malpractice .... There is simply no statutory basis for the use of a 10% 
interest rate." [R.7019 (emphasis added).] The district court ruled that section 15-
1-1 applied to the claim and awarded prejudgment interest at the rate of 10% per 
annum. [R. 7803-04.] The issue is preserved. 
As to the merits, Section 15-1-1 "applies only to judgments arising out of 
certain types of contract claims." Fuller v. Bohne, 2017 UT App 28, ,r1s, --- P.3d ---. 
Specifically, this court has held that the plain language of section 15-1-1 "limits 
the statute's application to only those contracts described therein: contracts for 
the loan ... of any money [or] goods or for the forbearance of any ... chose in 
action." USA Power, LLC v. PadfiCorp, 2016 UT 20, ,r108, 372 P.3d 629 (quotations 
omitted) (alterations in original). 
If a matter is "not one of the contracts described in section 15-1-1, the 
interest rate provided therein does not apply." Id. ,r109. The Utah Court of 
Appeals recently applied USA Power to reject plaintiffs' argument that "[i]f a 
party has a chose in action that it does not collect on immediately, forbearance 
has occurred, triggering the statutory ten percent rate." Fuller, 2017 UT App 28, 
,r19. The court held that "section 15-1-1 does not apply to the [plaintiffs'] tort-
based claims." Id. 
Here, the professional malpractice claim at issue does not fall under the 
plain language of section 15-1-1, and Plaintiffs are entitled- at most- to 
prejudgment interest at the postjudgment interest rate. USA Power, 2016 UT 20, 
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ifl09 (explaining that where section 15-1-1 does not apply, "section 15-1-4 
provides the appropriate mterest rate"). Thus, if this court determines that 
Plaintiffs are entitled to prejudgment interest, it should nevertheless remand so 
the award can be recalculated using the correct interest rate. 
For these reasons, the Defendants respectfully request that the court vacate 
the jury's award and enter judgment in favor of the Defendants, or, in the 
alternative, grant a new trial, or, at a mmim.um, vacate the district court's award 
of interest at 10% per annum pursuant to section 15-1-1. 
Argument on Cross-Appeal 
The district court did not commit reversible error in instructing the jury on 
the definition of an "offer or sale" under the Utah Uniform Securities Act ("Utah 
Securities Act"), Utah Code section 61-1-13(bb). Plaintiffs' arguments on cross-
appeal misapprehend the standard of review, the preservation standard, and the 
merits. Further, Plaintiffs fail to establish they were prejudiced by the district 
court's decision to include four non-exclusive factors within an instruction that 
explicitly told the jury that it was free to "consider other evidence presented 
during the case to determine whether a person actively and directly participated 
m soliciting a person's purchase of a security." [R.6826.] This section will address 
each argument in turn. 
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1. Standard of Review 
Plaintiffs claim that the question of whether the district court erred in 
rejecting its version of Instruction 13 in favor of Defendants' version should be 
reviewed by this court for correctness. [Resp.Br. at 11.] But this court "review[s] a 
district court's refusal to give a jury instruction for abuse of discretion." Miller v. 
Utah Dep't ofTransp., 2012 UT 54, if 13, 285 P.3d 1208. It is only when the court's 
discretion is "strictly cabined" or "constrained such that a party is legally entitled 
to have a particular instruction given to the jury" that a court's refusal to provide 
an instruction constitutes an error of law. Id. ifl3 & n.l. This court has outlined 
two circumstances in which discretion is cabined: "First, when a criminal 
defendant's ability to have the charged offense defined for the jury is at issue; 
and second when a party's ability to present its theory of the case to the jury is at 
issue." USA Power, LLC v. PadfiCorp, 2016 UT 20, if 75 n. 82, 372 P.3d 629. The first 
circumstance is not at issue in this matter. As to the second, under Instruction 13 
as given, Plaintiffs were not precluded from arguing their theory of the case -
that Mr. Bloomfield sold a security as an unlicensed agent of a broker-dealer. 
This court should therefore review the court's refusal to give Plaintiffs' version of 
Instruction 13 under the general abuse of discretion standard. 
2. Preservation 
Plaintiffs' cross-appeal raises two arguments: first, that Instruction 13 is 
reversible error because it includes factually inapplicable factors, and second, 
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that Instruction 13 is reversible error because it includes legally incorrect factors. 
[Resp.Br. at 57-66.] Plaintiffs did not preserve either argument for appeal. 
In order to preserve an issue for appeal, a party must raise "a timely and 
specific objection." State v. Low, 2008 UT 58, if 17, 192 P.3d 867 ( quotations 
omitted). This court has explained that, "if a party makes an objection at trial 
based on one ground, this objection does not preserve for appeal any alternative 
grounds for objection." Id. Thus, when a defendant objected to a jury instruction 
on a basis other than the reason he "urge [ d] as grounds for reversal" on appeal, 
this court rejected the defendant's claim for lack of preservation. Id. if 18. 
As to the factual challenge, the district court explained at the jury 
instruction conference that it did not "have a problem with [the lists of behavior 
that might constitute securities fraud,] as long as you include language that says 
something to the effect [that] this list is not exhaustive, the jury may find other 
behaviors that constitute evidence of sales of securities versus just a referral." 
[R.8865-66.] In response, Plaintiffs asked the district court to include additional 
~ language to make clear that "each of those factors isn't weighted necessarily 
equally," but Plaintiffs never asked the court to include other factors in the list. 
[R.8866.] The district court agreed with Plaintiffs, and adjusted the form to 
include the sentence: "These factors are also not necessarily to be weighted 
equally, and you may apply the weight you deem appropriate in determining 
whether a person actively and directly participated in soliciting a person's 
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purchase of a security." [R.6826.] Plaintiffs never objected to the district court's 
revision of Instruction 13, which was based on their own suggestion. 
Accordingly, Plaintiffs' factual challenge is unpreserved. 
But even if the factual challenge was preserved, the legal challenge 
certainly was not. In the written objections filed prior to the jury instruction 
conference, Plaintiffs argued that the factors listed in Instruction 13 were 
"superfluous," "confus[ing]," and "irrelevant." [R.6294.] But they never 
suggested that those factors were legally incorrect. In fact, Plaintiffs cited in 
support of their proposed instruction the very case they now claim is the source 
of the errors. [Compare R.6239 (citing Fed. Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Provo Excelsior 
Ltd., 664 F. Supp. 1405, 1411 (D. Utah 1987), as reference for Plaintiffs' Proposed 
Instruction 13) with Resp.Br. at 59-63 (arguing that Federal Savings & Loan does 
not apply to a Utah securities law claim).] 
This court should therefore refuse to consider whether the district court 
erred in submitting a non-exclusive list of factors to the jury, because Plaintiffs 
failed to preserve that issue below and failed to argue plain error on appeal. State 
v. Weaver, 2005 UT 49, if 19, 122 P.3d 566. 
3. The district court's decision to list non-exclusive factors in Instruction 13 
is not reversible error 
This section will first address Plaintiffs' factual challenge- that the 
inclusion of the non-exclusive list of factors requires reversal under the facts of 
this case. It will then address Plaintiffs' legal challenge that the factors were 
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legally incorrect. Finally, and in the alternative, it will establish that Plaintiffs 
have failed to demonstrate any prejudice flowing from Instruction 13. 
3.1 Plaintiffs' factual challenge to Instruction 13 lacks merit 
Plaintiffs argue that the district court comm.itted reversible error, under the 
facts of this case, by including in Instruction 13 a non-exclusive list of factors. 
[Resp.Br. at 57-59.] Plaintiffs' argument rests on an incorrect interpretation of 
Utah law. 
This court "generally presume[s] that a jury will follow the instructions 
given [to] it." State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393,401 (Utah 1994). And, in determining 
whether jury instructions created confusion, "a reviewing court must consider all 
of the jury instructions read together in light of the total evidence before the 
jury." State v. Lawson, 688 P.2d 479,481 (Utah 1984). 
When reviewed under the above standard, Instruction 13 did not create 
sufficient confusion to require reversal of the jury's verdict. At the outset, it bears 
noting that Plaintiffs do not cite any case law supporting the proposition that a 
va} factor is irrelevant just because the facts undisputedly favor one side. For 
example, to determine whether a person is an independent contractor under 
Utah law, a jury would properly be instructed to consider five factors: "(1) 
agreements between the parties about who had the right of control; (2) the right 
to hire and fire; (3) the method of payment; (4) who was actually directing the 
work; and (5) who furnished the equipment." MUJI 2d CV2814. Under Plaintiffs' 
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theory, a district court would necessarily err in using this model jury instruction 
whenever any factor undisputedly weighed against a finding of independent 
contractor status. But the fact that a factor can be resolved based on the 
undisputed facts does not make the factor irrelevant. 
To be sure, the present case undisputedly involved the things described in 
the allegedly "inapplicable" factors. The transactions at issue featured "Private 
Placement Memoranda," "Subscription Agreements," "Promissory Notes," 
"presentations" to "securities brokers and investment analysts," market analysis, 
and negotiations. [R.6826.] Instruction 13 properly invited the jury to consider 
whether Mr. Bloomfield-or someone else-participated in each of those 
activities, and directed it to weigh, or give no weight at all, to those 
considerations in determining whether Mr. Bloomfield "actively and directly 
participate[d] in soliciting" the sales at issue. [Id.] 
Plaintiffs' analogy to a "note job" robbery is therefore misplaced. [Resp.Br. 
at 58.] If Defendants understand the term correctly, such robberies do not involve 
guns, masks, or threats, as they are accomplished via a note demanding money. 
But as noted above, Instruction 13 did not do the equivalent of instructing a jury 
in a "note job" case to consider whether or not a gun was used. Rather, it simply 
directed the jury to consider, among other things, whether Mr. Bloomfield 
participated in certain activities that were undisputedly relevant to the sale at 
issue. Had Plaintiffs desired to have other factors listed, the district court's ruling 
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indicates that it would have included them. [R.8865-66.] But Plaintiffs never 
asked.6 
But even if Plaintiffs are correct, and factors which undisputedly weigh in 
favor of one party are therefore "irrelevant," they do not cite a single case 
supporting the proposition that a district court abuses its discretion by including 
such factors in an explicitly non-exclusive list within a jury instruction. Plaintiffs 
misread State v. Tenney in arguing that it stands for the proposition that "it [is] 
error for a court to include exceptions that clearly [do] not apply." [Resp.Br. at 59 
(citing 913 P.2d 750,758 (Utah Ct. App. 1996).] In Tenney, the Utah Court of 
Appeals held it was not an abuse of discretion for a district court to refuse to 
include factually inapplicable factors. 913 P.2d 750, 758 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) 
(citing Anderson v. Toone, 671 P.2d 170, 174 (Utah 1983)). Tenney necessarily did 
not reach the question they presented on appeal here-whether the inclusion of 
an inapplicable factor amounts to an abuse of discretion. 
Plaintiffs' next case, Turner v. University of Utah Hospitals & Clinics, is 
~ similarly inapposite. [Resp.Br. at 59 (citing 2013 UT 52, if17, 310 P.3d 1212).] 
Turner did not address whether a district court abuses its discretion in including 
factually inapplicable factors in a non-exclusive list. 2013 UT 52, ,r,r14-24. Rather, 
6 For example, Plaintiffs lament that the factors "should have focused on 
whether a Defendant met personally with investors." [Resp.Br. at 63.] 
Unfortunately, Plaintiffs never asked the district court to include this factor in 
Instruction 13. 
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Turner addressed an instruction which was flawed because it" explicitly 
direct[ed] the jury to return a 'no negligence' verdict if it f[ound] that there was 
'more than one method of treatment.'" Id. ,r22. The court concluded that "this 
mislabeling [was] significant [because the] instruction could have led the jury to 
erroneously conclude that if it was acceptable to either post or not post a sign, 
they should find no medical negligence." Id. if 24. If Instruction 13 had instructed 
the jury that Mr. Bloomfield could not be considered a seller unless he II actively 
participate[ d] in road show presentations," Turner might have some bearing on 
this case. But Instruction 13 - like other instructions in this case not challenged 
on appeal- only provided the jury a list of factors to weigh, or not weigh, at its 
discretion. [R.6826-27.] Turner does not suggest that such instructions are an 
abuse of discretion. 
Defendants could not identify any Utah law that supports Plaintiffs' 
argument that the inclusion of factually inapplicable factors in a jury instruction 
amounts to an abuse of discretion. In Anderson v. Toone, the case relied upon by 
Tenney, this court found an instruction erroneous because it provided the jury 
with a legally insufficient ground to rest its verdict, not because the jury was 
instructed on a factually insufficient ground. 671 P.2d 170, 174-75 (Utah 1983), 
overruled on other grounds by Randle v. Allen, 862 P.2d 1329 (Utah 1993), (holding 
that the jury instruction on II assumption of risk" was harmless error because, as a 
legal matter, "assumption of risk should not be treated separately from 
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contributory negligence in comparative negligence cases"). The distinction 
between factually and legally insufficient grounds is significant. When presented 
with legally incorrect instructions -such as the assumption of risk instruction at 
issue in Anderson-juries are "not generally equipped to determine whether a 
particular theory ... is contrary to law." Griffin v. United States, 502 U.S. 46, 59 
(1991). But "[q]uite the opposite is true ... when they have been left the option of 
relying upon a factually inadequate theory, since jurors are well equipped to 
analyze the evidence." Id. As a result, it is well-settled that a district court does 
not abuse its discretion by failing to delete factually inapplicable factors from a 
jury instruction. See, e.g., State v. Trinh, 326 P.3d 939, 967 (Cal. 2014) (holding 
district court was "under no obligation to omit" "inapplicable aggravating or 
mitigating factors"); State v. Cunningham, 25 P.3d 519,595 (Cal. 2001) (rejecting 
the claim that it was prejudicial to a defendant to include factually inapplicable 
factors); Bonin v. Vasquez, 794 F. Supp. 957,980 (C.D. Cal. 1992) ("[T]he court's 
failure to delete the inapplicable factors was not error."). 
\@ In the present case, the jury was not confused by the inclusion of possibly 
factually inapplicable factors in Instruction 13. Unlike the instruction in Turner, 
the jury was not instructed that it should find in favor of Mr. Bloomfield if it 
concluded that factual support for any of the factors listed was lacking. 2013 UT 
52, ,r,r22-24. To the contrary, Instruction 13 correctly informed the jury that "[£]or 
a person other than the person who actually transfers title in the stock to qualify 
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as a seller or offeror, that person must actively and directly participate in 
soliciting a person's purchase of the security." [R.6826.] It then listed four factors 
that jurors "may" consider in determining whether Mr. Bloomfield "actively and 
directly participated in soliciting" Plaintiffs' purchases at issue. Then, after listing 
those factors, it instructed jurors that" [t]his list of factors is not exhaustive and 
you may consider other evidence presented during the case to determine 
whether a person actively and directly participated in soliciting a person's 
purchase of a security." [Id.] Then, at the invitation of Plaintiffs', it instructed that 
"[t]hese factors are also not necessarily to be weighted equally, and you may 
apply the weight you deem appropriate in determining whether a person 
actively and directly participated in soliciting a person's purchase of a security." 
[Id.] When "read together in light of the total evidence before the jury," 
Instruction 13 did not create confusion. Lawson, 688 P.2d at 481. Accordingly, this 
court should reject Plaintiffs' factual challenge to Instruction 13, even if it 
considers this issue preserved for appeal. 
3.2 Plaintiffs' legal challenges to Instruction 13 lack merit 
Plaintiffs also argue that Instruction 13 was erroneous because the factors 
listed in that instruction represent federal law, not Utah law, and because, even 
under federal law, the factors are not required for seller liability. Plaintiffs also 
suggest that Utah law does not allow such factors to be considered. None of 
these arguments is correct. 
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Even if this court finds Plaintiffs' argument to be preserved, those 
argument fail, as Instruction 13 is neither erroneous nor prejudicial to Plaintiffs. 
For an appellate court to find that a district court abused its discretion in refusing 
to give a particular jury instruction, it must evaluate whether the instructions 
given II correctly state the law." State v. Beckering, 2015 UT App 53, if 23, 346 P.3d 
672 (quotations omitted). To do so, courts "look at the jury instructions in their 
entirety" and II affirm when the instructions taken as a whole fairly instruct the 
jury on the law applicable to the case." Id. (quotations omitted). But even if there 
is an error in the instructions, appellate courts will not reverse "unless that error 
is harmful." State v. Shepherd, 1999 UT App 305, ,r23, 989 P.2d 503. "Only harmful 
and prejudicial errors constitute grounds for granting a new trial." State v. Young, 
853 P.2d 327, 347 (Utah 1993). 
Here, Plaintiffs are not entitled to a new trial on their claims under the 
Utah Securities Act because Instruction 13, on its own and taken in context with 
the instructions as a whole, is not erroneous. 
3.2.1 The factors listed in Instruction 13, derived from Federal 
Savings & Loan, apply to claims under the Utah Securities 
Act 
Plaintiffs claim that Instruction 13 was erroneous because the factors listed 
in the instruction are only relevant to a federal law claim-specifically, a claim 
under section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933-and are not relevant to an 
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analysis under the Utah Securities Act. [Resp.Br. at 59-63.] In fact, those factors 
are as relevant to a state law claim as they are a federal law claim. 
The section of Instruction 13 at issue lists a number of factors for the 
purpose of aiding the jury in determining "whether a person actively and 
directly participated in soliciting a person's purchase of a security." [R.6826.] The 
instruction states that the jury "may" consider four factors. [Id.] Defendants 
included the factors because, " [ a ]bsent a listing of such factors, the jury will be 
left with no guidance on what the instruction means when it says a 'person must 
actively and directly participate in soliciting a person's purchase of the 
security.'" [R.6295.] Defendants explained that the factors were "taken directly 
from Federal Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Provo Excelsior Ltd., 664 F. Supp. 1405, 1411 
(D. Utah 1987)." [R.6295.] Although Plaintiffs did not include this list of factors in 
their proposed instruction, both Defendants and Plaintiffs cited Federal Savings & 
Loan in their list of references for their respective proposed instructions. [R.6238-
39.] 
On appeal, Plaintiffs attempt to distinguish Federal Savings & Loan on the 
basis that the case "addressed the question '[w]ho is a "Seller" under§ 12(2) of 
the 1933 Act,"' [Resp.Br. at 60, quoting Fed. Sav. & Loan, 664 F. Supp. at 1410], and 
they "did not allege a cause of action under any federal securities laws, much 
less§ 12(2)." [Resp.Br. at 59]. But Plaintiffs fail to acknowledge that not only does 
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Federal Savings & Loan address sellers under section 12(2), it also addresses sellers 
under the Utah Uniform Securities Act. 664 F. Supp. at 1408, 1412. 
Federal Savings & Loan involved claims under both the federal Securities 
Act of 1933 and Utah Code section 61-1-22(1)(b). Id. at 1408. The court first 
considered the question of who is a "seller" under section 12(2) of the 1933 
Securities Act. Id. at 1409. In evaluating this question, the court adopted the 
"middle ground definition of 'seller"' as expressed in In re Activision Securities 
Litigation, 621 F. Supp. 415 (N.D. Cal. 1985). Fed. Sav. & Loan, 664 F. Supp. at 1411. 
Immediately following the court's analysis of who is a seller under section 12(2) 
of the 1933 Securities Act, the court considered "[s]eller [s]tatus" under section 
22(1)(b) of the Utah Uniform Securities Act, or, what it labeled "the [c]ounterpart 
Utah [l]aw." Fed. Sav. & Loan, 664 F. Supp. at 1412 (emphasis added). The court 
quoted Utah Code section 61-1-22(1)(b) and explained as follows: "Thus, 
§ 22(1)(b), like its federal counterpart§ 12(2), appears to impose a strict privity 
requirement. However, consistent with this court's holding regarding the federal 
~ statute,§ 22(1)(b) is interpreted to include within the class of persons potentially 
liable only those persons who actually and directly participate in soliciting a 
plaintiff's purchase to the extent that they are a substantial factor in the actual 
offer or sale." Id. In other words, the court adopted the same analysis for sellers 
under Utah Code section 61-1-22(1)(b) as it did under section 12(2) of the 1933 
Securities Act. 
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Contrary to Plaintiffs' assertion, Federal Savings & Loan directly supports 
the proposition that "the factors for determining liability under § 12(2) of the 
Securities Act of 1933, a federal statute, are the same as those to determine 
liability on the claims Plaintiffs brought." [Resp.Br. at 61.] This conclusion finds 
support in the Utah Uniform Securities Act itself. The Act instructs that it is to be 
interpreted consistent with "related federal regulation," which includes the 
Securities Act of 1933. Utah Code§ 61-1-27 ("This chapter may be so construed as 
to effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the law of those states which 
enact it and to coordinate the interpretation and administration of this chapter 
with the related federal regulation."). 
It bears emphasizing that Plaintiffs listed Federal Savings & Loan as a 
reference in support of its proposed instruction 13. [R.6239.] While Plaintiffs' 
proposed instruction did not include the list of factors, it was intended to 
represent Utah law. Indeed, Plaintiffs described its proposed instruction as 
"consistent with the statutory definition of an 'offer' and 'sale' under the Utah 
Uniform Securities Act." [R.6294.] There would be no reason for Plaintiffs to cite 
Federal Savings & Loan unless they thought the legal analysis was an accurate 
expression of and relevant to an instruction on state securities law, which it is. It 
is disingenuous for Plaintiffs to now claim Federal Savings & Loan has no 
applicability here. 
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Further, Plaintiffs' argument that the factors are not "legally required[] to 
establish liability as a seller" ignores the limiting language of Instruction 13. 
[Resp.Br. at 62.] First, the sentence introducing those factors clearly states that the 
jury "may" consider the factors. [R.6826.] It does not instruct or suggest that a 
jury is required to consider those factors, much less affirmatively find support for 
them. And even if that was not enough, the paragraph that follows the list of 
factors makes clear the factors are not intended to be determinative of sellers' 
liability: "This list of factors is not exhaustive and you may consider other 
evidence presented during the case to determine whether a person actively and 
directly participated in soliciting a person's purchase of a security. These factors 
are also not necessarily to be weighted equally, and you may apply the weight 
you deem appropriate in determining whether a person actively and directly 
partj.cipated in soliciting a person's purchase of a security." [Id.] Instruction 13 is 
not erroneous because it does not suggest that the factors are "legally required [] 
to establish liability as a seller," nor does it foreclose a case-specific analysis of 
~ Defendants' behavior. [Resp.Br. at 62.] The factors simply serve the purpose for 
which they were offered, to guide the jury II on what the instruction means when 
it says a 'person must actively and directly participate in soliciting a person's 
purchase of the security."' [R.6295.] 
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3.2.2 Utah law does not preclude inclusion of the factors listed 
in Instruction 13 
Plaintiffs also claim that Instruction 13 was erroneous because Utah law 
precludes the addition of "additional factors or elements ... to the simple 
statutory definitions of 'offer' or 'sale' under the Utah Securities Act." [Resp.Br. 
at 63.] Plaintiffs cite State v. Balson, 2007 UT App 268, 167 P.3d 539, for this 
argument, but misrepresent the reach of that case. 
Ms. Bolson was convicted of selling an unregistered security under Utah 
Code section 61-1-7. Id. if 1. On appeal, she claimed "that the State failed to 
produce sufficient evidence to support her conviction." Id. ,I19. She argued "that 
the State did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that she had the intent and 
ability to complete the transactions in which she was involved." Id. 
The court of appeals dismissed her argument, explaining that she failed 
"to present a tenable legal argument for her position that the lack of proof of her 
intent and ability to complete transactions ... precludes a conviction on this 
count." Id. ,I20. It also explained that "[t]he statute does not contemplate a 
defendant's ability or authority to actually complete these transactions, and 
[Bolson] has not presented us with any persuasive analysis that would require 
the addition of these elements." Id. In other words, the court rejected Bolson' s 
attempt to add additional elements to the crime for which she was convicted. But 
adding additional elements to a crime is far different from adding 
nondeterminative "factors" to a jury instruction for the purpose of aiding a jury. 
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Balson, therefore, does not support an argument that factors relevant to Utah 
securities law cannot be provided in a jury instruction simply because they are 
not listed in in the statute. 
3.3 Even if Instruction 13 was erroneous, Plaintiffs suffered no 
prejudice 
But even if Plaintiffs' factual and legal challenges to Instruction 13 have 
merit, Plaintiffs' arguments fail because they are unable to demonstrate 
prejudice. "Errors with regard to jury instructions require reversal only if 
confidence in the jury's verdict is undermined." Hess v. Canberra Dev. Co., 2011 
UT 22, if 38,254 P.3d 161. Confidence in the verdict is only undermined if "there 
is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome." State v. Powell, 2007 UT 
9, if 21, 154 P.3d 788 ( quotation omitted). 
Plaintiffs' prejudice argument rests on its misreading of Instruction 13. 
[Resp.Br. 65-66.] For example, Plaintiffs imply that the jury was instructed that it 
must consider all of the factors, and go so far as to describe them as "elements" 
and "exemptions." [Id. at 63-66.] But Instruction 13 does not purport to describe 
any "exemptions" or elements that must be considered. [R.6826.] Rather, 
Instruction 13 provides a thorough definition of "offer or sale," and then includes 
a non-exclusive list of factors that "may" be worth considering. [Id.] The 
Instruction then highlights that" [t]his list of factors is not exhaustive," and 
instructs the jury that it may consider all of the evidence at trial in determining 
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whether Mr. Bloomfield "actively and directly participated in soliciting a 
person's purchase of a security." [Id.] 
Plaintiffs' supposition that the jury must have considered the factors listed 
in Instruction 13 is belied by the arguments presented at trial. In closing, 
Plaintiffs' counsel emphasized to the jury that "all the factors in the instructions 
are just some factors that some courts have seen in some cases." [R.9948.] Mr. 
Bloomfield's counsel similarly emphasized that the factors listed were "not an 
exhaustive list." [R.9976.] And Plaintiffs' counsel certainly did not view the 
factors as "exemptions," as he also went to great lengths to argue that the jury 
should consider Mr. Bloomfield a seller regardless of whether there was evidence 
to support each of the listed factors: 
In Instruction 13 it talks about the definition of offer or sell, and 
I'd suggest to you that as you look at this, the real question is was 
that person actively and directly participat[ing] in soliciting a 
person's purchase of a security. 
There could be no more accurate description for what Mr. 
Bloomfield did. He came to my clients and said there's an oil and 
gas deal that I'm familiar with. He recommended to them how much 
they should invest. Three of them met with no one other than Mr. 
Bloomfield. What does that mean? 
Ladies and gentlemen, if you show up at a car dealership and 
you only meet with one person, that one person is the guy who sold 
you the car, or woman who sold you the car, right? There might be a 
million other people behind the scenes. That person sold you the car 
because they're the only one you met with. No one else could have 
done it. 
They had to be actively and directly participat[ing] in soliciting 
your purchase of that car. Mr. Bloomfield did. It talks about 
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advertising. Did he build the car? No, he didn't build the car, but he 
was the guy up front who met with them, who actively and directly 
participated in soliciting their investment. He pitched them, met 
with them multiple[] times, was the only one to meet with three out 
of the five. 
The others, he was there with Feldman when Mr. Feldman met 
with them that one time. He was there. He tabbed the documents for 
them to sign. He gave them the directions on where to send the 
money. He got a commission, ladies and gentlemen. He was actively 
and directly involved in selling the security. 
[R.9946-47.] 
In sum, the factors listed in Instruction 13 did not play a meaningful part 
in either side's arguments to the jury. To the contrary, the jury's decision 
necessarily turned on the arguments which were made to the jury, which focused 
on whether Mr. Bloomfield fl actively and directly participate[d] in soliciting" the 
purchases at issue. Accordingly, even if this court concludes that the district 
court abused its discretion in including them, it should nevertheless affirm the 
jury's verdict because Plaintiffs cannot establish a reasonable likelihood of a 
different outcome absent the error. 
Conclusion 
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants respectfully request that the court 
vacate the jury's award and enter judgment in favor of Defendants, or, in the 
alternative, grant a new trial, or, at a minimum, vacate the district court's award 
of prejudgment interest at 10% per annum pursuant to section 15-1-1. Defendants 
likewise request that the court affirm the jury verdict on Plaintiffs' claims arising 
under the Utah Securities Act. 
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